Marco Rubio’s candid remarks in Mumbai highlight the enduring truth of U.S.–Pakistan relations: Washington keeps the channel open not because it trusts Islamabad, but because cutting it off has never solved the problem.
When Secretary of State Marco Rubio sat for interviews in Mumbai in October 2026, including at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, the site of the 2008 attacks that killed more than 160 people, six of them American, he offered an unusually unsentimental description of Washington's relationship with Pakistan. The relationship, he said, "does not come at the expense" of the partnership with India. The United States and India "share the same concerns" about terrorism originating from Pakistan. And engagement with Islamabad persists, in part, because it gives Washington "hopefully more influence over the decisions they make on a variety of topics" and a channel that can "help discourage the kinds of things that India is worried about."
Why Washington Keeps the Channel Open
The phrasing is careful, but the logic is plain. The United States does not maintain ties with Pakistan because the two governments share values, strategic vision, or mutual trust. It maintains them because Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, occupies a sensitive geographic position, and has an institutionalized capacity to generate problems for its neighbors. The relationship is an instrument of influence and risk management.
Under the Trump administration, that transactional logic has acquired a specific immediate purpose: according to administration officials cited in US reporting, Washington has leaned on Islamabad to help press Tehran toward American terms. The channel is kept open so the United States can extract utility, apply pressure, and, when necessary, limit the damage of Pakistani decisions, not because those decisions are expected to align with American or Indian interests.
This is consistent with how successive administrations have behaved. Periods of closer cooperation have repeatedly been followed by restrictions, aid suspensions, or public rebukes once the Pakistani security establishment's support for militant groups became too costly or too visible. Rubio himself, as a senator, signaled willingness to condition security assistance on Pakistan's behavior toward India. As Secretary of State he has moderated the language without abandoning the premise: the United States is "against anybody who sponsors terrorism," and a working channel with Islamabad is useful precisely because it may help discourage such sponsorship. The channel is retained because cutting it off has not proven more effective.
The Militant Proxy Problem
The terrorism point is not rhetorical. American officials have long accepted the core of India's assessment that Pakistan's intelligence apparatus, specifically the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), treats militant groups as usable assets. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, planned and executed by Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives with facilitation from within Pakistan documented in US and Indian investigations, remain the clearest public case; the continued existence of groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed has reinforced the pattern.
Nor is the approach confined to India. Pakistan's intelligence agencies have applied similar methods toward Afghanistan, treating militant and irregular forces as instruments of state policy. A cross-border infiltration attempt in Afghanistan's Nuristan province, in which intercepted fighters were reported to be former Afghan Republic soldiers recruited and directed by Pakistani intelligence, underscored that reality. Islamabad has also drawn on displaced former Afghan military personnel inside its own borders, deploying them in Balochistan to help suppress the local insurgency. Whether directed outward against neighbors or inward against domestic unrest, the pattern reflects an intelligence apparatus that relies on proxy forces as standard operating procedure.
Influence Without Alignment
Washington's response has varied in intensity, ranging from designations and aid conditions to private pressure, but the underlying judgment has been stable across administrations. Rubio's decision to speak at the site of the 2008 attacks was not accidental; it placed the shared concern in a concrete historical frame rather than an abstract one.
The result is a policy of managed engagement rather than partnership. Rubio's formulation, that closer ties with Pakistan do not come at India's expense and that the two countries share terrorism concerns, restates a long-standing American position while acknowledging practical constraints. Influence is possible; alignment is not. Whether Washington is using Islamabad to pressure Iran or attempting to deter the next cross-border attack in South Asia, the relationship remains fundamentally transactional. Whether American leverage is sufficient, or whether the ISI's incentives will continue to outweigh it, remains the open question the relationship has never fully resolved.
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Mirwais is an independent analyst writing on Afghanistan, Pakistan, militancy, and regional security. Follow his commentary on X