While Pakistan has expelled more than 2.75 million Afghans, former Afghan soldiers and police in Balochistan are reportedly being recruited into irregular, state-aligned militias. This analysis examines how vulnerable veterans are being pulled into Pakistan’s proxy conflicts against Baloch insurgents and Kabul.
On November 16, 2026, gunmen shot dead Sharifullah, a former Afghan local police commander from Ghazni Province, in Balochistan’s Sarwanan market. Having left Afghanistan after the fall of the previous government in 2021, he had already survived an earlier armed attack in Iran before relocating to Pakistan. No group claimed responsibility, and the identities and motives of his assailants remain unknown. Still, Sharifullah’s killing highlights the growing vulnerability of former Afghan security personnel living across the Durand Line.
His death also reflects a wider, largely unacknowledged security shift in southwestern Pakistan. Over the past year, investigative reporting, parliamentary interventions in Quetta, and regional security accounts have pointed to the settlement of former members of the pre-2021 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in Balochistan and their selective recruitment into irregular, state-aligned armed groups. Islamabad rejects allegations that it trains or recruits Afghan veterans. Even so, the pattern emerging in Balochistan looks familiar. For decades, Pakistan’s security establishment has leaned on deniable, irregular manpower to manage simultaneous pressures along the Afghan frontier and inside its most restive province.
Deportation Pressure and the Mechanics of Recruitment
Pakistan’s sweeping expulsion of Afghan nationals might seem inconsistent with the covert recruitment of former Afghan soldiers. Since launching its Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan in September 2023, Islamabad has pushed more than 2.75 million Afghans back across the Durand Line. Balochistan sits at the center of that campaign, with Quetta ranking as the leading origin city for returnees nationwide and Chaghi district ranking among the top three districts for refugee arrests.
Yet strict deportation enforcement creates acute leverage over a specific segment of the refugee population. For lower-ranking Afghan soldiers and police who crossed into Balochistan’s border belt after August 2021, returning home carries serious risks, from unresolved local feuds and wartime grievances to broader fears of reprisal tied to their former roles. Lacking legal status, formal work permits, or protection from police sweeps in Pakistan, unemployed Afghan veterans are left with few viable options.
Yet the convergence of first-hand recruitment testimony, on-the-record challenges from Pashtun legislators, and a string of targeted killings of Afghan veterans in Balochistan is too consistent to dismiss.
In September 2026, testimony published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) offered a rare look at how that vulnerability is exploited. Speaking under the pseudonym Khan, a former Afghan soldier living in Pakistan described repeated approaches to join counter-militancy operations in Balochistan. The offers came through a facilitator who had served as a police officer under the previous Afghan government and now lived comfortably in Pakistan with support from local officials. Recruits were offered roughly 40,000 Pakistani rupees (about $145) per month to join government-backed armed groups. Once enrolled, they were reportedly introduced to local police stations in their deployment zones so they could carry weapons and pass through checkpoints without fear of arrest.
Exact figures remain difficult to verify because these arrangements operate outside formal military rosters. A militant-tracking source cited in the same reporting estimated that nearly 2,000 former Afghan soldiers and police had been recruited in Balochistan. On the floor of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly in late August, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) lawmaker Fazal Qadir Mandokhail demanded an explanation from civilian and military leaders regarding the presence of thousands of former Afghan military personnel in the province and along the Durand Line. Days later, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party provincial president Abdul Qahar Wadan stated after a Quetta elders’ jirga that the presence of thousands of trained former Afghan militiamen in Balochistan was no longer a secret.
Skeptics of these accounts have reasonable grounds for caution. No payroll records have surfaced, residents in militarized districts can easily misidentify unfamiliar Pashto- or Dari-speaking militiamen as former Afghan troops, and Khan himself declined the offers rather than serving in the field. Yet the convergence of first-hand recruitment testimony, on-the-record challenges from Pashtun legislators, and a string of targeted killings of Afghan veterans in Balochistan is too consistent to dismiss.
Pakistan’s Two-Front Strain
The reported turn toward exiled Afghan veterans coincides with Pakistan fighting on two fronts at once in 2026.
Along the western frontier, Pakistan’s open armed conflict with Afghanistan escalated into sustained cross-border hostilities in February 2026 following border clashes and a year-long suspension of trade across major crossings. Regional reporting and security accounts indicate that Pakistani intelligence agencies initially organized displaced former republican troops in Balochistan camps to use as leverage against Kabul. That covert effort came into public view in late September during a failed infiltration attempt from Pakistan’s Chitral district into Afghanistan’s Nuristan Province. Heavy fighting left dozens of the crossing fighters dead and others in Afghan custody. According to Kabul’s Defense Ministry and testimonies attributed to the captured fighters, the men had been prepared at training centers in Balochistan and Chitral before being dispatched across the border.
Folding Afghan fighters into Balochistan militias 'will only empower criminal elements and foreign agents.' - Muhammad Amir Rana, Islamabad-based security analyst
At the same time, Pakistani forces are badly stretched at home. Between November 2024 and July 2026, ACLED data compiled by the European Union Agency for Asylum recorded 3,245 security incidents in Balochistan, accounting for 54 percent of Pakistan’s national total. State forces have maintained a relentless operational tempo to contain the violence, confronting both a better-equipped Balochistan Liberation Army, which has expanded its use of suicide bombings and drones, and a growing Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan presence in the province’s Pashtun-majority northern districts.
To compensate for a chronic policing deficit documented by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, security agencies have long relied on irregular local militias, known formally as lashkars or peace committees and widely criticized by human rights monitors as "death squads." Integrating non-Baloch, combat-trained Afghan veterans into these groups supplies immediate manpower while preserving official deniability. Even within Pakistan’s mainstream security community, the prospect has drawn blunt criticism. Writing in Dawn, Islamabad-based security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana noted that outsourcing counterinsurgency to private militias has historically weakened state legitimacy and invited violent retaliation. Addressing reports that agencies were folding Afghan fighters into Balochistan militias, Rana wrote that "nothing could be worse" and warned that it would "only empower criminal elements and foreign agents."
Official Silence and Political Fallout
A central question remains unanswered: whether this recruitment reflects a centralized directive from Islamabad or decentralized freelancing by frontier commanders and local militia patrons looking to fill manpower gaps. Pakistan’s uneven public posture makes it impossible to tell. When Kabul accused Pakistan of sending former Afghan fighters into Nuristan in late September, Pakistan’s Information Ministry issued swift, categorical denials, dismissing the claims as fabricated propaganda lacking forensic proof. Inquiries regarding domestic recruitment inside Balochistan, however, have met a wall of silence. Both the military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, and the office of Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti have declined to respond to media requests for comment, while provincial officials have limited themselves to demanding proof from critics.
Inside Balochistan, the reports have produced rare agreement across ethnic and political lines. Alongside Mandokhail and Wadan, JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman warned in July that fighting militancy is the sole responsibility of state agencies and that arming civilians or irregular groups only deepens local feuds. From Hudda District Prison in Quetta, imprisoned Baloch Yakjehti Committee organizer Dr. Mahrang Baloch issued a public appeal to Afghanistan’s former political leadership to prevent former Afghan personnel from participating in operations against Baloch communities. The Balochistan National Party released a similar condemnation in October, warning that proxy deployments risk damaging centuries of social ties between Baloch and Afghan communities.
The Fallout on the Ground
The consequences of this arrangement are already visible on the ground. In August, unidentified gunmen shot dead two former Afghan soldiers in Quetta. In October, regional reports detailed a coordinated drone and ground assault on a base housing former Afghan soldiers in Balochistan that killed five and wounded four, an incident on which neither Islamabad nor Kabul commented. Sharifullah’s killing in November reinforces the same reality: former Afghan personnel drawn into or living near Pakistan’s proxy networks hold little legal standing and receive no reliable physical protection.
Outsourcing security to vulnerable foreign veterans may offer short-term tactical relief to overstretched units while insulating the regular military from direct legal scrutiny. Pakistan’s own counterinsurgency record, however, shows how quickly deniable proxies erode formal policing, sharpen local grievances, and build armed networks that outlast the conflicts that created them. At a moment when Islamabad is struggling to protect Chinese infrastructure investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and find a viable off-ramp from border warfare with Kabul, injecting stateless Afghan combatants into Balochistan compounds both problems. Any eventual ceasefire along the Durand Line will be far harder to sustain if the province next door remains a staging ground for unaccountable armed men.